A Probabilistic Approach to Mean Field Games with Major and Minor
  Players by Carmona, Rene & Zhu, Xiuneng
ar
X
iv
:1
40
9.
71
41
v1
  [
ma
th.
PR
]  
25
 Se
p 2
01
4
A PROBABILISTIC APPROACH TO MEAN FIELD GAMES WITH MAJOR
AND MINOR PLAYERS
RENE´ CARMONA AND XIUNENG ZHU
Abstract. We propose a new approach to mean field games with major and minor players.
Our formulation involves a two player game where the optimization of the representative minor
player is standard while the major player faces an optimization over conditional McKean-Vlasov
stochastic differential equations. The definition of this limiting game is justified by proving that
its solution provides approximate Nash equilibriums for large finite player games. This proof
depends upon the generalization of standard results on the propagation of chaos to conditional
dynamics. Because it is on independent interest, we prove this generalization in full detail. Using
a conditional form of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle (proven in the appendix), we
reduce the solution of the mean field game to a forward-backward system of stochastic differential
equations of the conditional McKean-Vlasov type, which we solve in the Linear Quadratic setting.
We use this class of models to show that Nash equilibriums in our formulation can be different
from those of the formulations contemplated so far in the literature.
1. Introduction
Stochastic games are widely used in economic, engineering and social science applications, and
the notion of Nash equilibrium is one of the most prevalent notion of equilibrium used in their
analyses. However, when the number of players is large, exact Nash equilibria are notoriously
difficult to identify and construct explicitly. In an attempt to circumvent this roadblock, Lasry
and Lions in [18, 19, 20] initiated the theory of mean field games for a type of games in which
all the players are statistically identical, and only interact through their empirical distributions.
These authors successfully identify the limiting problem as a set of two coupled PDEs, the first
one of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman type and the second one of Kolmogorov type. Approximate Nash
equilibria for the finite-player games are then derived from the solutions of the limiting problem.
Motivated by the analysis of large communication networks, Huang, Malhame´ and Caines developed
independently a very similar program, see [16], under the name of Nash Certainty Equivalence. A
probabilistic approach was developed by Carmona and Delarue, see [5], in which the limiting system
of coupled PDEs is replaced by a fully coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equation
(FBSDE for short). Recently, an approach based on the weak formulation of stochastic controls was
introduced in [11] and models with a common noise studied in [9]..
From a modeling perspective, one of the major shortcomings of the standard mean field game
theory is the strong symmetry requirement that all the players in the game are statistically identical.
See nevertheless [16] where the asymptotic theory is applied to several groups of players. The second
requirement of the mean field games theory is that, when the number of players is large, the influence
of one single player on the system becomes asymptotically negligible. This is in sharp contrast with
some real-world applications. For example, in the banking system there are a few too big to fail
banks, and a large number of small banks whose actions and status impact the system no-matter
how large the number of small banks.
In [15], Huang introduced a linear-quadratic infinite-horizon model in which there exists a
major player, whose influence will not fade away when the number of players tends to infinity.
[23] introduces the finite-horizon counterpart, and [25] generalizes this model to the nonlinear case.
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These models are usually called ’mean field game with major and minor players’. Unfortunately,
the scheme proposed in [23, 25] fails to accommodate the case where the state of the major player
enters the dynamics of the minor players. To be more specific, in [23, 25], the major player influences
the minor players solely via their cost functionals. [24] proposes a new scheme to solve the general
case for linear-quadratic-Guassian (LQG for short) games in which the major player’s state enters
the dynamics of the minor players. The limiting control problem for the major player is solved by
what the authors call “anticipative variational calculation”. In [3], the authors take, like in [25],
a stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman approach to a type of general mean field games with major
and minor players, and the limiting problem is characterized by a set of stochastic PDEs.
In this paper, we analyze a type of general mean field games with major and minor players,
and develop a systematic scheme to find approximate Nash equilibria for the finite-player games
using a purely probabilistic approach. The limiting problem is identified as a two-player stochastic
differential game, in which the control problem faced by the major player is of conditional McKean-
Vlasov type, while the optimization problem faced by the representative minor player is a standard
control problem. A matching procedure then follows the solution of the two-player game, which gives
a FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov type as a characterization of the solution of the limiting problem. The
construction of approximate Nash equilibria for the finite-player games with the aid of the limiting
problem is also elaborated, with the approximate Nash equilibrium property carefully proved both
for the major player and minor players, which fully justifies the scheme we propose. We believe that
the results in this paper lead to a much more comprehensive understanding of this type of problems.
While [3] is clearly the closest contribution to ours, our paper differs from [3] in the following
ways: first, we use a probabilistic approach based on a new version of the Pontryagin stochastic max-
imum principle for conditional McKean-Vlasov dynamics in order to solve the embedded stochastic
control problems, while in [3] a HJB equation approach is taken. Second, the limiting problem
is defined as a two-player game as opposed to the three problems articulated in [3]. We believe
that this gives a better insight into this kind of mean field games with a major player. Third, the
finite-player game in [3] is a N -player game including only the minor players, and the major player
is considered exogenous, and doesn’t provide an active participation in the game. The associated
propagation of chaos is then just a randomized version of the usual propagation of chaos associated
to the usual mean field games, and the limiting scheme is not completely justified. Here we define
the finite-player game as an (N + 1)-player game including the major player. The construction of
approximate Nash equilibriums is proved for the minor players and most importantly, for the major
player as well, fully justifying our limiting scheme for finding approximate Nash equilibria.
The classical theory of propagation of chaos, in which particles are identical is well developed.
See for example the elegant treatment in [27] and a more recent account in [17]. However, when
introducing a major particle in the system, even when the number of particles tends to infinity,
the influence of this major particle on the other particles does not average out in the limit. This
creates interesting novel features not present in the classical theory. They involve conditioning with
respect to the information flow associated to the major particle. Our propagation of chaos result for
SDEs of McKean-Vlasov type with conditional distributions is given in the stand alone Section 7.
The results of this section play a crucial role in the construction of approximate Nash equilibriums
for the limiting two-player game in Section 4. They are independent of the results on Mean Field
Games. For this reason, we include them at the end of the paper, not to disrupt the flow.
The advantages of using the probabilistic approach are threefold. First, the probabilistic frame-
work is natural when dealing with open-loop controls. In the present situation, the persistence of
the influence of the major player forces the controls to be random, at least partially, even when
looking for strategies in closed loop form. Second, the limiting conditional McKean-Vlasov control
problem faced by the major player can be treated most elegantly using an appropriate version of the
Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle. Since such a form of the stochastic maximum principle
is not available in the published literature, we provide it in an appendix at the end of the paper.
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Third, our approach can rely on existing results in the literature on the well-posedness of FBSDEs
and their associated decoupling fields in order to address the solvability of the limiting problem.
The mean field game model with major and minor players investigated in this paper is as follows.
The major player which is indexed by 0, can choose a control process u0,N taking values in a convex
set U0 ⊂ R
k0 , and every minor player indexed by i ∈ {1, · · · , N} can choose a control process ui,N
taking values in a convex set U ⊂ Rk. The state of the system at time t is given by a vector
XNt = (X
0,N
t , X
1,N
t , · · · , X
N,N
t ) ∈ R
d0+Nd whose controlled dynamics are given by{
dX0,Nt = b0(t,X
0,N
t , µ
N
t , u
0,N
t )dt+ σ0(t,X
0,N
t , µ
N
t , u
0,N
t )dW
0
t ,
dX i,Nt = b(t,X
i,N
t , µ
N
t , X
0,N
t , u
i,N
t )dt+ σ(t,X
i,N
t , µ
N
t , X
0,N
t , u
i,N
t )dW
i
t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
(1)
where (W it )i≥0 is a sequence of independent Wiener processes, and
µNt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXi,Nt
(2)
is the empirical distribution of the states of the minor players, δx standing for the point Dirac mass
at x. The Wiener processW 0 is assumed to be m0 dimensional while all the other Wiener processes
W i for i ≥ 1 are assumed to be m-dimensional. X0,Nt (and hence b0) is d0-dimensional while all the
other X i,Nt (and hence b) are d-dimensional. Finally, for consistency reasons, the matrices σ0 and
σ are d0 ×m0 and d ×m dimensional respectively. The major player aims at minimizing the cost
functional given by
J0,N (u0,N , uN) = E
[∫ T
0
f0(t,X
0,N
t , µ
N
t , u
0,N
t )dt+ g0(X
0,N
T , µ
N
T )
]
, (3)
and the minor players aim at minimizing the cost functionals:
J i,N (u0,N , uN ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X i,Nt , µ
N
t , X
0,N
t , u
i,N
t )dt+ g(X
i,N
T , µ
N
T , X
0,N
T )
]
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (4)
We use the notation uN for (u1,N , · · · , uN,N). We observe readily that an important difference
between the current model and the usual mean field game model is the presence of the state of the
major player in the state dynamics and the cost functionals of the minor players. Even when the
number of minor players is large, the major player can still influence the behavior of the system in
a non-negligible manner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the preliminary section 2 we review briefly
the usual mean field game scheme, and then proceed to the scheme for the mean field games with
major and minor players proposed in this paper. Some heuristic arguments leading to the scheme
are also provided, and the difference between the current scheme and the one used in [23, 25] are
highlighted. In section 3 we carry out the scheme described in section 2 for a type of mean field
games with major and minor players with scalar interactions, and we use the Pontryagin maximum
principle to solve the embedded stochastic control problems. The FBSDE of conditional mean field
type characterizing the Nash equilibria for the limiting two-player game is derived. In section 4,
we prove that the solution of the limiting problem can actually be used to build approximate Nash
equilibria for the finite-player games, justifying our scheme. In section 5, we apply the scheme
to the case of Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG for whort) models, and find explicit approximate
Nash equilibria for the finite-player games, and in section 6 a concrete example is given to show
that the current scheme leads to different results from the scheme proposed in [24] and [25]. In the
independent section 7, we prove a conditional version of propagation of chaos which plays a pivotal
role in the construction of approximate Nash equilibria in section 4. Finally, in the appendix at the
end of the paper, we prove a version of the sufficient part of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum
principle for conditional McKean-Vlasov dynamics used in solving the stochastic control problem
faced by the major player.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Brief Review of the Standard Mean Field Game Problem. A standard introduction to
the mean field game (MFG for short) theory starts with an N -player stochastic differential game,
the dynamics of the states of the players being governed by stochastic differential equations (SDEs)
dX i,Nt = b(t,X
i,N
t , µ
N
t , u
i,N
t )dt+ σ(t,X
i,N
t , µ
N
t , u
i,N
t )dW
i
t , i = 1, 2, ..., N,
each player aiming at the minimization of a cost functional
J i,N (u) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X i,Nt , µ
N
t , u
i,N
t )dt+ g(X
i,N
T , µ
N
T )
]
,
where µNt stands for the empirical distribution of the X
N,i
t for i = 1, · · · , N . The usual MFG scheme
can be summarized in the following 3 steps:
(1) Fix a deterministic flow (µt)0≤t≤T of probability measures.
(2) Solve the standard stochastic control problem: minimize
J(u) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, µt, ut)dt+ g(XT , µT )
]
,
when the controlled dynamics of the process Xt are given by
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, ut)dt+ σ(t,Xt, µt, ut)dWt.
(3) Solve the fixed point problem Φ(µ) = µ, where for each flow µ as in step (1), Φ(µ) denotes
the flow of marginal distributions of the optimally controlled state process found in step (2).
If the above scheme can be carried out successfully, it is usually possible to prove that the optimal
control found in step (2) can be used to provide approximate Nash equilibriums for the finite-player
game. The interested reader is referred to [18, 19, 20, 16] for detailed discussions of the PDE
approach of the above scheme and to [5, 11] for two different probabilistic approaches.
2.2. Heuristic derivation of MFG approach. In this subsection we provide a heuristic argument
which leads to a scheme for mean field games with major and minor players. The finite-player games
are described by equations (1)-(4) above. Because all the minor players are identical and influenced
by the major player in exactly the same way, it is reasonable to assume that they are exchangeable,
even when the optimal strategies (in the sense of Nash equilibrium) are implemented. On the other
hand, for any sequence of integrable exchangeable random variables (Xi)i≥1, de Finetti’s law of
large numbers states that almost surely,
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXi =⇒ L(X1|G),
for some σ-field G where =⇒ denotes convergence in distribution. We may want to apply this result
for each time t to the individual states X i,Nt in which case, a natural candidate for the σ-field G
could be the element F0t of the filtration generated by the Wiener processW
0 driving the dynamics
of the state of the major player. This suggests that in mean field games with major and minor
players, we can proceed essentially in the same way as in the standard mean field game theory,
except for the fact that instead of fixing a deterministic measure flow in the first step, we fix an
adapted stochastic measure flow, and in the last step, match this stochastic measure flow to the flow
of marginal conditional distribution of the state of the representative minor player given F0t . This is
in accordance with intuition since, as all the minor players are influenced by the major player, they
should make their decisions conditioned on the information provided by the major player. Notice
that this is also consistent with the procedure used in the presence of a so-called common noise as
investigated in [9].
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However, the above argument fails to apply to the major player. Indeed, no matter how many
minor players are present in the game, the major player’s control influences all the minor players,
and in particular, the empirical distribution formed by the minor players. When we construct the
limiting problem for the major player, it is thus more reasonable to allow the major player to control
the stochastic measure flow, instead of fixing it a priori. This asymmetry between major and minor
players was also observed in [3].
2.3. Precise formulation of the MFG problem with major and minor players. Using the
above heuristic argument, we arrive at the following scheme for the major-minor mean field game
problem. The limiting control problem for the major player is of conditional McKean-Vlasov type,
where the measure flow is endogenous, and the limiting control problem for the representative minor
player is a standard one, where the measure flow is exogenous and fixed at the beginning of the
scheme. As a consequence, the limiting problem becomes a two-player stochastic differential game
between the major player and a representative minor player, instead of two consecutive stochastic
control problems for each of them. Specifically:
(1) Fix a F0-progressively measurable stochastic measure flow (µt)0≤t≤T where F
0 = (F0t )t≥0
denotes the filtration generated by the Wiener process W 0.
(2) Consider the following two-player stochastic differential game where the control (u0t )0≤t≤T
of the first player is assumed to be adapted to F0, and the control (ut)0≤t≤T of the second
player is assumed to be adapted to the filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 generated by W , and where
the controlled dynamics of the state of the system are given by


dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t ,L(Xt|F
0
t ), u
0
t )dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t ,L(Xt|F
0
t ), u
0
t )dW
0
t ,
dXt = b(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), X
0
t , ut)dt+ σ(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), X
0
t , ut)dWt,
dXˇ0t = b0(t, Xˇ
0
t , µt, u
0
t )dt+ σ0(t, Xˇ
0
t , µt, u
0
t )dW
0
t ,
dXˇt = b(t, Xˇt, µt, Xˇ
0
t , ut)dt+ σ(t, Xˇt, µt, Xˇ
0
t , ut)dWt,
(5)
and the cost functionals for the two players are given by
J0(u0, u) = E
[∫ T
0
f0(t,X
0
t ,L(Xt|F
0
t ), u
0
t )dt+ g0(X
0
T ,L(XT |F
0
T ))
]
,
J(u0, u) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Xˇt, µt, Xˇ
0
t , ut)dt+ g(XˇT , µT , Xˇ
0
T )
]
,
where L(Xt|F
0
t ) stands for the conditional distribution of Xt given F
0
t . We look for Nash
equilibria for this game.
(3) Satisfy the consistency condition
µt = L(Xt|F
0
t ), ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (6)
where Xt is the second component of the state controlled by u
0 and u giving the Nash
equilibrium found in step (2).
Notice that the above consistency condition amounts to solving a fixed point problem in the space of
stochastic measure flows. Notice also that even when the X i,Nt are scalar, the system (5) describes
the dynamics of a 4-dimensional state driven by two independent Wiener processes. The dynamics
of the first two components are of the conditional McKean-Vlasov type (because of the presence of
the conditional distribution L(Xt|F
0
t ) of Xt in the coefficients) while the dynamics of the last two
components are given by standard stochastic differential equations with random coefficients. In this
two player game, the cost functional J0 of the major player is of the McKean-Vlasov type while the
cost functional J of the representative minor player is of the standard type. As explained earlier,
this is the main feature of our formulation of the problem.
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Later in the paper, we show that if we are able to find a fixed point in the third step, i.e.
a stochastic measure flow (µt)0≤t≤T satisfying (6), we can use it to construct approximate Nash
equilibria for the finite-player games when the number of players is sufficiently large. The precise
meaning of this statement will be made clear in section 4.
3. Mean Field Games with Major and Minor Players: The General Case
In this section we analyze in detail the scheme explained in the previous section, and we derive
a FBSDE characterizing the solution to the limiting problem. We assume that Ω is a standard space
and F is its Borel σ-field, so that regular conditional distributions exist for all sub-σ-fields. The
definition of standard probability spaces we use here can be found in [4]. The finite-player games
are described by (1)-(4) where (W i)i≥0 is a sequence of independent Wiener processes. We shall
use the following assumptions.
(A1) There exists a constant c > 0 such that for all t ∈ [0, T ], x′0, x0 ∈ R
d0 , x′, x ∈ Rd, µ′, µ ∈
P2(R
d), u0 ∈ U0 and u ∈ U we have
|(b0, σ0)(t, x
′
0, µ
′, u′0)− (b0, σ0)(t, x0, µ, u0)|+ |(b, σ)(t, x
′, µ′, x′0, u
′)− (b, σ)(t, x, µ, x0, u)|
≤ c
(
|x′0 − x0|+ |x
′ − x|+ |u′0 − u0|+ |u
′ − u|+W2(µ
′, µ)
)
.
(7)
(A2) For all u0 ∈ U0 and u ∈ U we have
E
[∫ T
0
|(b0, σ0)(t, 0, δ0, u0)|
2 + |(b, σ)(t, 0, δ0, 0, u)|
2
]
<∞.
(A3) There exists a constant cL > 0 such that for all x0, x
′
0 ∈ R
d0 , u0, u
′
0 ∈ R
k0 and µ, µ′ ∈ P2(R
d),
we have
|(f0, g0)(t, x
′
0, µ
′, u′0)− (f0, g0)(t, x0, µ, u0)|
≤ cL
(
1 + |(x′0, u
′
0)|+ |(x0, u0)|+M2(µ
′) +M2(µ)
)(
|(x′0, u
′
0)− (x0, u0)|+W2(µ
′, µ)
)
,
and for all x0 ∈ R
d0 , x, x′ ∈ Rd, u, u′ ∈ Rk and µ, µ′ ∈ P2(R
d),
|(f, g)(t, x′, µ′, x0, u
′)− (f, g)(t, x, µ, x0, u)|
≤ cL
(
1 + |(x′, u′)|+ |(x, u)|+M2(µ
′) +M2(µ)
)(
|(x′, u′)− (x, u)|+W2(µ, µ
′)
)
.
where P2(R
d) denotes the set of probability measures of order 2 (i.e. with a finite second moment),
and W2(µ, µ
′) the 2-Wasserstein distance between µ, µ′ ∈ P2(R
d). Also, we used the notation
M2(µ) =
∫
|x|2µ(dx) for the second moment of µ.
(A4) The functions b0, b, f and g are differentiable in x0, x and µ. Differentiability with respect to
measure arguments is discussed in the appendix at the end of the paper.
Assumptions (A1)-(A2) guarantee that for all admissible controls, the SDEs (1)-(4) and (5)
have unique solutions, and (A3) guarantees that the associated cost functionals are well-defined.
Assumption (A4) will be used when we define adjoint processes for the limiting control problems.
In the following, we use S2,d(F;U) to denote all F-progressively measurable processes X taking
values in U ⊂ Rd such that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Xt|
2
]
<∞, (8)
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H2,d(F;U) to denote all U -valued F-progressively measurable processes X such that
E
[∫ T
0
|Xt|
2
]
<∞, (9)
and finally we useM2,d(F) to denote the set of F-progressively measurable stochastic measure flows
µ on Rd such that
E
[∫ T
0
∫
Rd
|x|2dµt
]
<∞. (10)
We will omit the filtration F and the domain U when there is no risk of confusion.
3.1. Control problem for the major player. In this subsection we consider the limiting two-
player game and search for the major player’s best response u0 to the control u of the representative
minor player. This amounts to solving the optimal control problem based on the controlled dynamics{
dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t ,L(Xt|F
0
t ), u
0
t )dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t ,L(Xt|F
0
t ), u
0
t )dW
0
t , X
0
0 = x
0
0,
dXt = b(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), X
0
t , ut)dt+ σ(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), X
0
t , ut)dWt, X0 = x0,
(11)
and the cost functional
J0(u0) = E
[∫ T
0
f0(t,X
0
t ,L(Xt|F
0
t ), u
0
t )dt+ g0(X
0
T ,L(XT |F
0
T ))
]
,
where it is assumed that the control u is given, the set of admissible controls u0 being the space
H2,k0(F0;U0). In what follows, this stochastic control problem will be denoted by (P1). We check
readily that conditions (A2.1) - (A2.3) in the appendix at the end of the paper are satisfied. The
Hamiltonian is defined as
H0(t, x0, x, µ, p0, p, q00, q11, u0, u) = 〈p0, b0(t, x0, µ, u0)〉+ 〈p, b(t, x, µ, x0, u)〉
+ 〈q00, σ0(t, x0, µ, u0)〉+ 〈q11, σ(t, x, µ, x0, u)〉+ f0(t, x0, µ, u0).
(12)
We then introduce the following assumption regarding minimization of this Hamiltonian.
(M0) For all fixed (t, x0, x, µ, p0, p, q00, q11, u) there exists a unique minimizer of the Hamiltonian
H0 as a function of u0. Note that this minimizer should not depend upon p, q11 and u. It will be
denoted by uˆ0(t, x0, µ, p0, q00).
Remark 3.1. This assumption is satisfied when the running cost f0 is strictly convex in u
0, the
drift b0 is linear in u
0 and the volatility σ0 is uncontrolled in the sense that it does not depend upon
u0. This will be the case in the examples considered later on.
For each admissible control u0, the associated adjoint process (P 0, P,Q00, Q01, Q10, Q11) is de-
fined as the solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE):

dP 0t = −∂x0H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, u
0
t , ut)dt+Q
00
t dW
0
t +Q
01
t dWt,
dPt =− ∂xH0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, u
0
t , ut)dt+Q
10
t dW
0
t +Q
11
t dWt
− EF
0
t [∂µH0(t, X˜t,L(X˜t|F
0
t ), P˜ t, Q˜t, u
0
t , ut)(Xt)]dt
,
P 0T = ∂x0g(X
0
T ,L(XT |F
0
t )),
PT = E
F0T [∂µg(X˜
0
T ,L(X˜T |F
0
T ))(XT )],
(13)
where to lighten the notations we write X = (X0, X), P = (P 0, P ) and Q = (Q00, Q01, Q10, Q11).
We refer the reader to appendix at the end of the paper for 1) definitions of the tilde notation, which
provides a natural extension of random variables to an extension of the original probability space,
and of EF
0
t [·] which denotes expectation with respect to the regular conditional distribution on an
extension of the original probability space, and 2) references to the definition and the properties of
the differentiation with respect to the measure argument. Despite the presence of the conditional
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distributions in the coefficients, standard proofs of existence and uniqueness of solutions of BSDEs
with Lipschitz coefficients still apply to (13), for example when the derivatives of assumption (A4)
are uniformy Lipshitz with linear growth. See for example [7].
In order to minimize the complexity of the notation, we systematically add a bar on the top of
a random variable to denote its conditional expectation with respect to F0t , for example P¯
0 stands
for E[P 0|F0t ].
Once properly extended to cover the present situation, (see [6] for the necessary condition in
the unconditional case, and the appendix for the sufficient condition) the necessary part of the
Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle says that, if the control u0 = (u0t )t is optimal, then the
Hamiltonian (12) is minimized along the trajectory of (X0t , Xt, P t, Qt). So given assumption (M0)
and the sufficient condition of the stochastic maximum principle proven in the appendix at the end
of the paper, uˆ0t = uˆ
0(t,X0t ,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P¯
0
t , Q¯
00
t ) will be an optimal control for the problem at hand
if we can solve the forward backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE):


dX0t = ∂p0H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , ut)dt+ ∂q00H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , ut)dW
0
t ,
dXt = ∂pH0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , ut)dt+ ∂q11H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , ut)dWt,
dP 0t = −∂x0H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , ut)dt+Q
00
t dW
0
t +Q
01
t dWt,
dPt =− ∂xH0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , ut)dt+Q
10
t dW
0
t +Q
11
t dWt
− EF
0
t [∂µH0(t, X˜t,L(X˜t|F
0
t ), P˜ t, Q˜t,
˜ˆu0t , ut)(Xt)]dt
(14)
with the initial and terminal conditions given by
X00 = x
0
0, X0 = x0, P
0
T = ∂x0g(X
0
T ,L(XT |F
0
t )), PT = E
F0T [∂µg(X˜
0
T ,L(X˜T |F
0
T ))(XT )].
In general, FBSDEs are more difficult to solve than BSDEs. This is even more apparent in the
case of equations of the McKean-Vlasov type. See nevertheless [7] for an existence result in the
unconditional case. In its full generality, the solvability of FBSDE (14) of conditional McKean-
Vlasov type is beyond the scope of this paper. We will solve it only in the linear quadratic case.
We show in the appendix that appropriate convexity assumptions are sufficient for optimality.
We summarize them for later reference.
(C0) The function Rd0 × P2(R
d) ∋ (x, µ) →֒ g(x, µ) is convex. The function
R
d0 × Rd × P2(R
d)× U0 ∋ (x0, x, µ, u0) →֒ H(t, x0, x, µ, p0, p, q00, q11, u0, u)
is convex for all fixed (t, p0, p, q00, q11, u).
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Let us assume that (A1)-(A3), (M0) and (C0) are in force. If
(X0, X, P 0, P,Q00, Q01, Q10, Q11) ∈ S2,d0+d × S2,d0+d × H2,(d0+d)×(d0+d)
is a solution to the FBSDE (14), then u0t = uˆ
0(t,X0t ,L(XT |F
0
t ), P¯
0
t , Q¯
00
t ), is an optimal control for
problem (P1) and (X0, X) is the associated optimally controlled state process.
3.2. Control problem for the representative minor player. For the representative minor
player’s best response control problem, for each fixed stochastic measure flow µ in M2,d(F0) and
for each admissible control u0 = (u0t )t of the major player, we solve the optimal control problem of
the controlled dynamics{
dXˇ0t = b0(t, Xˇ
0
t , µt, u
0
t )dt+ σ0(t, Xˇ
0
t , µt, u
0
t )dW
0
t , Xˇ
0
0 = x
0
0,
dXˇt = b(t, Xˇt, µt, Xˇ
0
t , ut)dt+ σ(t, Xˇt, µt, Xˇ
0
t , ut)dWt, Xˇ0 = x0
(15)
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for the cost functional
J(u) = E
[ ∫ T
0
f(t, Xˇt, µt, Xˇ
0
t , ut) + g(XˇT , µT , Xˇ
0
T )
]
. (16)
Note that since u0 and µ are fixed, the first SDE in (15) can be solved off line, and its solution appears
in the second SDE of (15) and the cost functional only as an exogenous source of randomness. If
we choose the set of admissible controls for the representative minor player to be H2,k(FW0,W ;U)
where FW0,W is the filtration generated by both Wiener processes W 0 and W , this problem is a
standard non-Markovian stochastic control problem. We shall denote it by (P2) in the following.
For this reason, we introduce only adjoint variables for Xˇt, and use the reduced Hamiltonian:
H(t, x0, x, µ, y, z11, u
0, u) = 〈y, b(t, x, µ, x0, u)〉+ 〈z11, σ(t, x, µ, x0, u)〉+ f(t, x, µ, x0, u). (17)
As before, in order to find a function satisfying the Isaacs condition, we introduce the following
assumption regarding its minimization.
(M) For all fixed (t, x0, x, µ, y, z11, u0), there exists a unique minimizer of the above reduced Hamil-
tonian H as a function of u. This minimizer will be denoted by uˆ(t, x0, x, µ, y, z11).
For all admissible control u we can define the adjoint process (Y , Z) = (Y 0, Y, Z00, Z01, Z10, Z11)
associated to u as the solution of the following BSDE:

dY 0t = −∂x0H(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, u
0
t , ut)dt+ Z
00
t dW
0
t + Z
01
t dWt,
dYt = −∂xH(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, u
0
t , ut)dt+ Z
10
t dW
0
t + Z
11
t dWt,
Y 0T = ∂x0g(XˇT , µT , Xˇ
0
T ), YT = ∂xg(XˇT , µT , Xˇ
0
T ).
(18)
The existence of the adjoint processes associated to a given admissible control u is a consequence of
the standard existence result of solutions of BSDEs when the partial derivatives of b, σ and f with
respect to x0 and x are uniformly bounded in (t, x0, x, µ). The necessary part of the Pontryagin
stochastic maximum principle says that, if the admissible control u = (ut)t is optimal, then the
Hamiltonian (17) is minimized along the trajectory of (X0t , X
t, Y t, Zt). So given assumption (M)
and the sufficient condition of the stochastic maximum principle (see for example the appendix in
section 8), uˆt = uˆ(t,X
0
t , Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), Y t, Zt) will be an optimal control for the problem at hand if
we can solve the forward backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE):
The standard Pontryagin maximum principle tells us that the optimal control should be given by
uˆt = uˆ(t, Xˇ
0
t , Xˇt, µt, Yt, Z
11
t ), and plugging this expression into the controlled dynamics and BSDE
(18) gives us the following FBSDE:

dXˇ0t = ∂y0H(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, u
0
t , uˆt)dt+ ∂z00H(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, u
0
t , uˆt)dW
0
t ,
dXˇt = ∂yH(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, u
0
t , uˆt)dt+ ∂z11H(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, u
0
t , uˆt)dWt,
dY 0t = −∂x0H(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, u
0
t , uˆt)dt+ Z
00
t dW
0
t + Z
01
t dWt,
dYt = −∂xH(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, u
0
t , uˆt)dt+ Z
10
t dW
0
t + Z
11
t dWt,
(19)
with the initial and terminal conditions given by
Xˇ00 = x
0
0, Xˇ0 = x0, Y
0
T = ∂x0g(XˇT , µT , Xˇ
0
T ), YT = ∂xg(XˇT , µT , Xˇ
0
T ).
We also need the following convexity assumption.
(C) The function Rd × P2(R
d)× Rd0 ∋ (x, µ, x0) →֒ g(x, µ, x0) is convex in (x0, x). The function
R
d0 × Rd × P2(R
d)× U ∋ (x0, x, µ, u) →֒ H(t, x0, x, µ, y0, y, z00, z11, u0, u)
is convex for all (t, y0, y, z00, z11, u0). Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Assuming that (A1-2), (M) and (C) are in force, if (Xˇ0, Xˇ, Y 0, Y, Z00, Z01, Z10, Z11) ∈
S
2,d0+d×S2,d0+d×H2,(d0+d)×(d0+d) is a solution to the FBSDE (19), then an optimal control of the
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control problem (P2) is given by
ut = uˆ(t, Xˇ
0
t , Xˇt, µt, Yt, Z
11
t ),
and (Xˇ0, Xˇ) is the associated optimally controlled state process.
3.3. Nash equilibrium for the limiting two-player game. By the very definition of Nash
equilibria, the following proposition is self-explanatory.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that (A1-2), (M0), (M), (C0) and (C) are in force. Consider the fol-
lowing FBSDE:

dX0t = ∂p0H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+ ∂q00H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dW
0
t ,
dXt = ∂pH0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+ ∂q11H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dWt,
dXˇ0t = ∂y0H(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+ ∂z00H(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dW
0
t ,
dXˇt = ∂yH(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+ ∂z11H(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dWt,
dP 0t = −∂x0H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+Q
00
t dW
0
t +Q
01
t dWt,
dPt =− ∂xH0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+Q
10
t dW
0
t +Q
11
t dWt
− EF
0
t [∂µH0(t, X˜t,L(X˜t|F
0
t ), P˜ t, Q˜t,
˜ˆu0t ,
˜ˆut)(Xt)]dt
dY 0t = −∂x0H(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+ Z
00
t dW
0
t + Z
01
t dWt,
dYt = −∂xH(t, Xˇt, µt, Y t, Zt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+ Z
10
t dW
0
t + Z
11
t dWt,
(20)
with the initial and terminal conditions given by

X00 = x
0
0, X0 = x0,
P 0T = ∂x0g(X
0
T ,L(XT |F
0
t )),
PT = E
F0T [∂µg(X˜
0
T ,L(X˜T |F
0
T ))(XT )],
,


Xˇ00 = x
0
0, Xˇ0 = x0,
Y 0T = ∂x0g(XˇT , µT , Xˇ
0
T ),
YT = ∂xg(XˇT , µT , Xˇ
0
T ),
where
uˆ0t = uˆ
0(t,X0t ,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P¯
0
t , Q¯
00
t ), uˆt = uˆ(t, Xˇ
0
t , Xˇt, µt, Yt, Z
11
t ).
If this FBSDE has a solution, then (uˆ0, uˆ) is a Nash equilibrium for the limiting two-player stochastic
differential game.
3.4. The consistency condition. The last step in the scheme amounts to imposing the consistency
condition which writes
µt = L(Xt|F
0
t ), ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Plugging it into FBSDE (20) gives the following ultimate FBSDE:


dX0t = ∂p0H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+ ∂q00H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dW
0
t ,
dXt = ∂pH0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+ ∂q11H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dWt,
dP 0t = −∂x0H0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+Q
00
t dW
0
t +Q
01
t dWt,
dPt =− ∂xH0(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P t, Qt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+Q
10
t dW
0
t +Q
11
t dWt
− EF
0
t [∂µH0(t, X˜t,L(X˜t|F
0
t ), P˜ t, Q˜t,
˜ˆu0t ,
˜ˆut)(Xt)]dt
dY 0t = −∂x0H(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), Y t, Zt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+ Z
00
t dW
0
t + Z
01
t dWt,
dYt = −∂xH(t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), Y t, Zt, uˆ
0
t , uˆt)dt+ Z
10
t dW
0
t + Z
11
t dWt,
(21)
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with initial and terminal conditions given by

X00 = x
0
0, X0 = x0,
P 0T = ∂x0g(X
0
T ,L(XT |F
0
T )),
PT = E
F0T [∂µg(X˜
0
T ,L(X˜T |F
0
T ))(XT )],
Y 0T = ∂x0g(XT ,L(XT |F
0
T ), X
0
T ),
YT = ∂xg(XT ,L(XT |F
0
T ), X
0
T ).
(22)
where this time we define
uˆ0t = uˆ
0(t,X0t ,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P¯
0
t , Q¯
00
t ), uˆt = uˆ(t,X
0
t , Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ), Yt, Z
11
t ).
Remark 3.2. Note that after implementing the consistency condition, (X0, X) and (Xˇ0, Xˇ) become
the same. We can also check that if we replace the current consistency condition by
µt = L(Xˇt|F
0
t ), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
we arrive at the same FBSDE as above.
Remark 3.3. In the limiting control problem faced by the representative minor player, the dynamic
of the major player is not affected by the control u and can be considered given. As a result,
the adjoint process Y 0 is redundant and independent of the rest of the system, and could have
been discarded from the system (21). It is there in (21) because we want to write the system in a
symmetric and compact fashion using the Hamiltonians H0 and H.
The solvability of conditional McKean-Vlasov FBSDEs in the form of (21) is a hard problem.
If the conditional distributions in (21) are replaced by plain distributions, the resulting FBSDEs
are usually called “mean field FBSDEs” and are studied in some recent papers, see for example [7].
The conditioning with respect to F0t makes (21) substantially harder to solve compared to the ones
already considered in the literature, and we leave the well-posedness of FBSDEs of the form of (21)
to future research.
4. Propagation of chaos and ǫ-Nash equilibrium
In this section we prove a central result stating that, when we apply the optimal control law found
in the limiting regime to all the players in the original N -player game, we will find an approximate
Nash equilibrium. This justifies the whole scheme as an effective way to find approximate Nash
equilibria for the finite-player games. Throughout this section we assume that (A1-4), (M), (M0),
(C) and (C0) hold. In addition, we assume that
(A5) The diffusion coefficients σ0 and σ are constants.
Assumption (A5) is too strong for what we really need. We should merely assume that the two
volatility σ0 and σ are independent of the controls u
0 and u. All the derivations given below can be
adapted to this more general setting, but in order to limit the complexity of the formulas appearing
in the arguments, we limit ourselves to assumption (A5).
Let’s first recall the finite-player game setup under the assumption (A5): the controlled dynamics
are now given by{
dX0,Nt = b0(t,X
0,N
t , µ
N
t , u
0,N
t )dt+ σ0dW
0
t , X
0,N
0 = x
0
0,
dX i,Nt = b(t,X
i,N
t , µ
N
t , X
0,N
t , u
i,N
t )dt+ σdW
i
t , X
i,N
0 = x0, i = 1, 2, ..., N,
(23)
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and the cost functionals by
J0,N = E
[∫ T
0
f0(t,X
0,N
t , µ
N
t , u
0,N
t )dt+ g0(X
0,N
T , µ
N
T )
]
,
J i,N = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X i,Nt , µ
N
t , X
0,N
t , u
i,N
t )dt+ g(X
i,N
T , µ
N
T , X
0,N
T )
]
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
The sets of admissible controls for this (N + 1)-player game are defined as follows.
Definition 4.1. In the above (N + 1)-player game, a process u0,N is said to be admissible for
the major player if u0,N ∈ H2,d0(F0, U0) and it is said to be κ-admissible for the major player if
additionally we have
E
[∫ T
0
|u0,Nt |
p
]
≤ κ. (24)
with i = 0 and p = d+5. On the other hand, a process ui,N is said to be admissible for the i-th minor
player if u1,N ∈ H2,d(FW
0,W 1,··· ,WN , U), and κ-admissible for the i-th minor player if additionally
it satisfies (24) with p = 2. The set of admissible controls and κ-admissible controls for the i-th
player are respectively denoted by Ai and A
κ
i , i ≥ 0. Note that Ai and A
κ
i are independent of i ≥ 1.
Note that due to (A1-3), for all (u0,N , u1,N , ..., uN,N) ∈
∏N
i=0Ai, the controlled SDE (23) always
has a unique solution. On the other hand, we will see that the notion of κ-admissible controls plays
an important role in Theorem 4.1 to obtain a quantitative uniform speed of convergence. We then
give the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium in the context of the above finite-player game.
Definition 4.2. A set of admissible controls (u0,N , u1,N , ..., uN,N) ∈
∏N
i=0Ai is called an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium in Aκ0 ×
∏N
i=1A
κ
i for the above (N + 1)-player stochastic differential game if for all
u0 ∈ Aκ0 we have
J0,N (u0,N , u1,N , ..., uN,N)− ǫ ≤ J0,N(u0, u1,N , ..., uN,N),
and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N and u ∈ Aκi we have
J i,N (u0,N , u1,N , ..., uN,N)− ǫ ≤ J i,N (u0,N , ..., ui−1,N , u, ui+1,N , ..., uN,N).
The following lemma is useful to derive explicit bounds on the rate of convergence of approximate
Nash equilibrium. In order to obtain a quantitative convergence estimate, we rely on the following
result of Horowitz and Karandikar which can be found in [26].
Lemma 4.1. Let (Xn) be a sequence of exchangeable random variables taking values in R
d with
directing (random) measure µ satisfying
c :=
∫
|u|d+5β(du) <∞.
where β is the marginal of µ in the sense that β(A) = E[µ(A)]. Then there exists a constant C
depending only upon c and d such that
E[W 22 (µ
N , µ)] ≤ cN−2/(d+4),
where as usual, µN is the empirical measure of X1, · · · , XN .
Recall that the directing measure of the sequence is the almost sure limit as N → ∞ of the
empirical measures µN Before stating and proving the central theorem of this section, we introduce
two additional assumptions.
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(A7) The FBSDE (21) admits a unique solution. Moreover, there exists a random decoupling field
θ : [0, T ]× Ω× Rd0 × Rd →֒ θ(t, ω, x0, x) such that
Yt = θ(t,X
0
t , Xt), a.s..
Finally θ satisfies:
(1) There exists a constant cθ such that
|θ(t, ω, x′0, x
′)− θ(t, ω, x0, x)| ≤ cθ(|x
′
0 − x0|+ |x
′ − x|).
(2) For all (t, x0, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R
d0 × Rd, θ(t, ·, x0, x) is F
0
t -measurable.
The concept of (deterministic) decoupling field lies at the core of many investigations of the
well-posedness of standard FBSDEs, see for example [14, 22]. Its non-Markovian counterpart cor-
responding to non-Markovian FBSDEs was introduced in [21]. The possibility of applying existing
results concerning the well-posedness of non-Markovian FBSDEs is appealing, but due to the condi-
tional McKean-Vlasov nature of FBSDE (21) a general sufficient condition is hard to come by, and
it is highly likely that well-posedness can only be established on a case-by-case basis. A concrete
sufficient condition of well-posedness and the existence of a decoupling field will be given in Section
5 for Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG for short) models.
The following theorem is the central result in this section. It stipulates that when the number
of players is sufficiently large, the solution of the limiting problem provides approximate Nash
equilibriums. Note that an important consequence of assumption (A5) is that the minimizer uˆ0
identified in the previous section is now independent of q00, and by an abuse of notation, we use
uˆ0(t, x0) to denote uˆ
0(t, x0,L(Xt|F
0
t ), P¯
0
t ). Accordingly, uˆ is now independent of z11, and if we
assume that (A7) is in force, Yt can then be written as θ(t,X
0
t , Xt), and again by a similar abuse of
notation we use uˆ(t, x0, x) to denote uˆ(t, x0, x,L(Xt|F
0
t ), θ(t, x0, x)), where X , P
0 solve the FBSDE
(21). Finally we impose
(A8) There exists a constant c such that for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x′0, x0 ∈ R
d0 ,
|uˆ0(t, x′0)− uˆ
0(t, x0)| ≤ c‖x
′
0 − x0‖, a.s..
Moreover,
E
[∫ T
0
|uˆ0(t, 0)|2dt
]
<∞.
Theorem 4.1. There exists a sequence (ǫN )N≥1 and a non-decreasing function ρ : R
+ → R+ such
that
(i) There exists a constant c such that for all N ≥ 1,
ǫN ≤ cN
−1/(d+4).
(ii) The feedback profile (uˆ0(t,X0,Nt ), (uˆ(t,X
0,N
t , X
i,N
t ))1≤i≤N ) forms an (ρ(κ)ǫN )-Nash equilibrium
for the (N + 1)-player game when the admissible control sets are taken as Aκ0 ×
∏N
i=1A
κ
i .
Proof. For a fixed N , we start with investigating what happens if the major player deviates from
the strategy uˆ0(t, Xˆ0,Nt ) unilaterally. When all the players apply the feedback controls identified in
the statement of the theorem, the resulting controlled state processes will be denoted by (Xˆ i,N)i≥0
and solve{
dXˆ0,Nt = b0(t, Xˆ
0,N
t , µˆ
N
t , uˆ
0(t, Xˆ0,Nt ))dt+ σ0dW
0
t , Xˆ
0,N
0 = x
0
0,
dXˆ i,Nt = b(t,X
i,N
t , µˆ
N
t , Xˆ
0
t , uˆ(t, Xˆ
0,N
t , Xˆ
i,N
t ))dt + σdW
i
t , Xˆ
i,N
0 = x0, i ≥ 1,
(25)
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where the empirical measures are defined as in (2). Following the approach presented in Section 7,
we define the limiting nonlinear processes as the solution of{
dXˆ0t = b0(t, Xˆ
0
t ,L(Xˆ
1
t |F
0
t ), uˆ
0(t, Xˆ0t ))dt+ σ0dW
0
t , Xˆ
0
0 = x
0
0,
dXˆ it = b(t, Xˆ
i
t ,L(Xˆ
1
t |F
0
t ), Xˆ
0
t , uˆ(t, Xˆ
0
t , Xˆ
i
t))dt+ σdW
i
t , Xˆ
i
0 = x0, i ≥ 1.
(26)
The stochastic measure flow L(Xˆ1t |F
0
t ) will be sometimes denoted by µˆt in the following. A direct
application of Theorem 7.1 in Section 7 yields the existence of a constant cˆ such that
max
0≤i≤N
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Xˆ i,Nt − Xˆ
i
t |
2
]
≤ cˆN−2/(d+4), (27)
and by applying the usual upper bound for 2-Wasserstein distance we also have
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
W 22
(
µˆNt ,
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXˆit
)]
≤ cˆN−2/(d+4), (28)
where cˆ depends upon T , the Lipschitz constants of b0, b, uˆ
0 and uˆ, and
ηˆ = E
∫ T
0
|Xˆ1t |
d+5dt.
Now we turn our attention to the cost functionals. We define
Jˆ0,N = E
[∫ T
0
f0(t, Xˆ
0,N
t , µˆ
N
t , uˆ
0(t, Xˆ0,Nt ))dt+ g0(Xˆ
0,N
T , µˆ
N
T )
]
,
Jˆ0 = E
[∫ T
0
f0(t, Xˆ
0
t , µˆt, uˆ
0(t, Xˆ0t ))dt+ g0(Xˆ
0
T , µˆT )
]
,
and we have, by assumptions (A3) and (A7), that
|Jˆ0,N − Jˆ0| =
∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
0
f0(t, Xˆ
0,N
t , µˆ
N
t , uˆ
0(t, Xˆ0,Nt )) + g0(Xˆ
0,N
T , µˆ
N
T )
]
− E
[∫ T
0
f0(t, Xˆ
0
t , µˆt, uˆ
0(t, Xˆ0t )) + g0(Xˆ
0
T , µT )
] ∣∣∣∣
≤E
∫ T
0
c
(
1 + |Xˆ0,Nt |+ |Xˆ
0
t |+ |uˆ
0(t, Xˆ0,Nt )|+ |uˆ
0(t, Xˆ0t )|+M2(µˆ
N
t ) +M2(µˆt)
)
(
|Xˆ0,Nt − Xˆ
0
t |+W2(µˆ
N
t , µˆt)
)
dt
≤cE
[∫ T
0
1 + |Xˆ0,Nt |
2 + |Xˆ0t |
2 +
1
N
N∑
i=1
|Xˆ i,Nt |
2 + |Xˆ1t |
2dt
]1/2
E
[∫ T
0
|Xˆ0,Nt − Xˆ
0
t |
2 +W 22 (µˆ
N
t , µˆt)dt
]1/2
(29)
and by applying (27) and (28) we deduce that
Jˆ0,N = Jˆ0 +O(N−1/(d+4)). (30)
Assume now that the major player uses a different admissible control v0 ∈ Aκ0 , and other minor
players keep using the strategies (uˆ(t, Xˆ i,Nt ))i≥1. The resulting perturbed state processes will be
denoted by (X˜ i,Nt )i≥0 and is the solution of the system{
dX˜0,Nt = b0(t, X˜
0,N
t , µ˜
N
t , v
0
t )dt+ σ0dW
0
t , X˜
0,N
0 = x
0
0,
dX˜ i,Nt = b(t, X˜
i,N
t , µ˜
N
t , X˜
0,N
t , uˆ(t, Xˆ
i,N
t ))dt+ σdW
i
t , X˜
i,N
0 = x0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
(31)
where as usual, µ˜Nt denotes the empirical distribution of the X˜
i,N
t . Note that Xˆ
i,N is not F0t -
progressively measurable in general, in order to apply Theorem 7.1 we combine (25) and (31) and
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consider the limiting nonlinear processes defined as the solution of

dXˆ0t = b0(t, Xˆ
0
t ,L(Xˆ
1
t |F
0
t ), uˆ
0(t, Xˆ0t ))dt+ σ0dW
0
t , Xˆ
0
0 = x
0
0,
dXˆ it = b(t, Xˆ
i
t ,L(Xˆ
i
t |F
0
t ), Xˆ
0
t , uˆ(t, Xˆ
i
t))dt+ σdW
i
t , Xˆ
i
0 = x0, i ≥ 1,
dX˜0t = b0(t, X˜
0
t ,L(X˜
i
t |F
0
t ), v
0
t )dt+ σ0dW
0
t , X˜
0
0 = x
0
0,
dX˜ it = b(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X˜
i
t |F
0
t ), X˜
0
t , uˆ(t, Xˆ
i
t))dt+ σdW
i
t , X˜
i
0 = x0, i ≥ 1,
(32)
and now Theorem 7.1 yields the existence of a constant c˜ such that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|X˜ i,Nt − X˜
i
t |
2
]
≤ c˜N−2/(d+4),
where c˜ depends upon T , the Lipschitz constants of b0, b, uˆ
0, u, ηˆ and
η˜ = E
∫ T
0
|X˜1t |
d+5dt.
It is important to note that η˜ depends on the control v0. On the other hand the coefficients b0 and
b are globally Lipschitz-continuous, so by usual estimates and Gronwall’s inequality, for all κ > 0
there exists a constant ρ1(κ) such that
E
∫ T
0
|v0t |
d+5dt ≤ κ =⇒ η˜ ≤ ρ01(κ).
It is then clear that for all κ > 0 there exists a constant ρ2(κ) such that
E
∫ T
0
|v0t |
d+5dt ≤ κ =⇒ c˜ ≤ ρ02(κ).
By using the same estimates as in (29), we deduce that there exists a constant ρ(κ) such that for
all v0 ∈ Aκ0 , we have
|J˜0,N − J˜0| ≤ ρ(κ)ǫNN
−1/(d+4). (33)
Finally, since (uˆ0(t, Xˆ0t ), uˆ(t, Xˆt)) solves the limiting two-player game problem, it is clear that
Jˆ0 ≤ J˜0, (34)
and combining (30), (33) and (34) we get the desired result for the major player.
We then consider the case when a minor player changes his strategy unilaterally, and without
loss of generality we consider the case when the minor player with index 1 changes his strategy to
v ∈ A1. This part of the proof is highly similar with that of Theorem 3 in [5], and we will refer to
[5] for some details of the proof in the following. The resulting perturbed controlled dynamics are
given by

dX¯0,Nt = b0(t, X¯
0,N
t , µ¯
N
t , uˆ
0(t, Xˆ0,Nt ))dt+ σ0dW
0
t , X¯
0,N
0 = x
0
0,
dX¯1,Nt = b(t, X¯
1,N
t , µ¯
N
t , X¯
0,N
t , vt)dt+ σdW
1
t , X¯
1,N
0 = x0,
dX¯ i,Nt = b(t, X¯
i,N
t , µ¯
N
t , X¯
0,N
t , uˆ(t, Xˆ
i,N
t ))dt+ σdW
i
t , X¯
i,N
0 = x0, 2 ≤ i ≤ N.
By the usual estimates on the difference between X¯ i,N and Xˆ i,N , and by applying Gronwall’s
inequality we can show that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|X¯0,Nt − Xˆ
0,N
t |
2
]
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|X¯ i,Nt − Xˆ
i,N
t |
2
]
≤
c
N
∫ T
0
|vt − uˆ(t, Xˆ
1,N
t )|
2dt. (35)
Combining the above bound, the growth properties of uˆ and (27), we see that for all κ > 0, there
exists a non-decreasing function ρ1 : R
+ → R+ such that∫ T
0
|vt|
2 ≤ κ ⇒ E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|X¯0,Nt − Xˆ
0
t |
2
]
+ E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
W 22 (µ¯t, µt)
]
≤ ρ1(κ)N
−2/(d+4).
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We hence conclude that there exists a non-decreasing function ρ2 : R
+ → R+ such that when∫ T
0 |vt|
2 ≤ κ, we have
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|X¯1,Nt − X¯
1
t |
2
]
≤ ρ2(κ)N
−2/(d+4),
where X¯1 is the solution of the SDE
dX¯1t = b(t, X¯
1
t , µt, X
0
t , vt)dt+ σdW
1
t , X¯
1
0 = x0, (36)
where µ and X0 are in the solution of the FBSDE (21). We then conclude in the same way as for
the major player. 
5. MFG with Major-Minor Agents: the LQG Case
The linear-quadratic-gaussian (LQG) stochastic control problems are among the best-understood
models in stochastic control theory. It is thus natural to expect explicit results for the major-minor
mean field games in a similar setting. This type of model was first treated in [15] in infinite horizon.
The finite-horizon case was treated in [23]. However, the state of the major player does not enter
the dynamics of the states of the minor players in [23]. The general finite-horizon case is solved in
[24] by the use of the so-called nonanticipative variational calculus. It is important to point out that
the notion of Nash equilibrium used in [24] corresponds to the Markovian feedback Nash equilibrium’
while here, we work with open-loop Nash equilibriums. In what follows, we carry out the general
systematic scheme introduced in the previous discussions and derive approximate Nash equilibria
for the LQG major-minor mean field games.
The dynamics of the states of the players are given by the following linear SDEs:{
dX0,Nt = (A0X
0,N
t +B0u
0,N
t + F0X¯
N
t )dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dX i,Nt = (AX
i,N
t +Bu
i,N
t + FX¯
N
t +GX
0
t )dt+DdW
i
t .
For the sake of presentation we introduce the linear transformations Φ and Ψ defined by:
Φ(X) = H0X + η0, and Ψ(X,Y ) = HX + HˆY + η.
The cost functionals for the major and minor players are given by
J0(u) = E
[∫ T
0
{
(X0t − Φ(X¯
N
t ))
†Q0(X
0
t − Φ(X¯
N
t )) + u
0†
t R0u
0
t
}
dt
]
,
J i,N (u) = E
[∫ T
0
{
(X i,Nt −Ψ(X
0
t , X¯
N
t ))
†Q(X i,Nt −Ψ(X
0
t , X¯
N
t )) + u
i,N†
t Ru
i,N
t
}
dt
]
,
in which Q, Q0, R and R0 are symmetric matrices and R and R0 are assumed to be positive definite.
We use the notation a† for the transpose of a.
We check readily that all previously mentioned assumptions hold in the above LQG setting. We
then arrive directly at the non-Markovian conditional McKean-Vlasov FBSDE (21) which writes
(note Remark 3.3)

dX0t = (A0X
0
t −
1
2B0R
−1
0 B
†
0E[P
0
t |F
0
t ] + F0E[Xt|F
0
t ])dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dXt = (AXt −
1
2BR
−1B†Yt + FE[Xt|F
0
t ] +GX
0
t )dt+DdWt,
dP 0t = (−A
†
0P
0
t −G
†Pt − 2Q0(X
0
t − Φ(E[Xt|F
0
t ])))dt+Q
00
t dW
0
t +Q
01
t dWt,
dPt =−A
†Pt +Q
10
t dW
0
t +Q
11
t dWt
− F †0E[P
0
t |F
0
t ]dt− F
†
E[Pt|F
0
t ]dt− 2H
†
0Q0(X
0
t − Φ(E[Xt|F
0
t ]))dt,
dYt = (−A
†Yt − 2Q(Xt −Ψ(X
0
t ,E[Xt|F
0
t ])))dt+ Z
0
t dW
0
t + ZtdWt,
(37)
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with the initial and terminal conditions given by
X00 = x
0
0, X0 = x0, P
0
T = PT = YT = 0.
As already explained at the end of Section 3, the solvability of general conditional McKean-Vlasov
FBSDEs is a difficult problem. However, due to the special linear structure of (37) we can go a step
further and look for more explicit sufficient conditions of well-posedness. As before, we use a bar to
denote the conditional expectation with respect to F0t , so we arrive at the following more compact
form:

dX0t = (A0X
0
t −
1
2B0R
−1
0 B
†
0P¯
0
t + F0X¯t)dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dXt = (AXt −
1
2BR
−1B†Yt + FX¯t +GX
0
t )dt+DdWt,
dP 0t = (−A
†
0P
0
t −G
†Pt − 2Q0X
0
t + 2Q0H0X¯t + 2Q0η0)dt+Q
00
t dW
0
t +Q
01
t dWt,
dPt =−A
†Pt +Q
10
t dW
0
t +Q
11
t dWt
− F †0 P¯
0
t dt− F
†P¯tdt− (2H
†
0Q0X
0
t − 2H
†
0Q0H0X¯t − 2H
†
0Q0η0)dt
dYt = (−A
†Yt − 2QXt + 2QHX
0
t + 2QHˆX¯t + 2Qη)dt+ Z
0
t dW
0
t + ZtdWt,
(38)
We then condition all the equations by the filtration F0t . The following lemma will be useful
when we deal with the Ito stochastic integral terms.
Lemma 5.1. Let Ft be a filtration and B a Ft-Brownian motion. Let H be a Ft-progressively
measurable process, then
E
[∫ T
0
HtdBt|FT
]
=
∫ T
0
E [Ht|Ft] dBt.
We then use this lemma to derive the SDEs satisfied by the conditional versions of the above
processes. We add a bar on the various processes to denote the conditional version, and since X0t is
already F0t -adapted, its notation will stay unchanged.

dX0t = (A0X
0
t −
1
2B0R
−1
0 B
†
0P¯
0
t + F0X¯t)dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dX¯t = (AX¯t −
1
2BR
−1B†Y¯t + FX¯t +GX
0
t )dt,
dP¯ 0t = (−A
†
0P¯
0
t −G
†P¯t − 2Q0X
0
t + 2Q0H0X¯t + 2Q0η0)dt+ Q¯
00
t dW
0
t ,
dP¯t =−A
†P¯t + Q¯
10
t dW
0
t
− F †0 P¯
0
t − F
†P¯t − (2H
†
0Q0X
0
t − 2H
†
0Q0H0X¯t − 2H
†
0Q0η0)dt
dY¯t = (−A
†Y¯t − 2QX¯t + 2QHX
0
t + 2QHˆX¯t + 2Qη)dt+ Z¯
0
t dW
0
t .
(39)
If we use X to denote (X0, X¯) and Y for (P¯ 0, P¯ , Y¯ ), we can write the above FBSDE in the following
standard form {
dXt = (AXt + BYt + C)dt+ DdW
0
t ,
dYt = −(AˆXt + BˆYt + Cˆ)dt+ ZtdW
0
t ,
(40)
with initial and terminal conditions given by
X0 =
(
x00
x0
)
, YT =

00
0

 ,
in which
A =
(
A0 F0
G A+ F
)
,B =
(
− 12B0R
−1
0 B
†
0 0 0
0 0 − 12BR
−1B†
)
,D =
(
D0
0
)
,
Aˆ =

 2Q0 −2Q0H02H†0Q0 −2H†0Q0H0
−2QH 2Q− 2QHˆ

 , Bˆ =

A†0 G† 0F †0 A† + F † 0
0 0 A†

 .
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In order to find explicit sufficient conditions of the well-posedness of the linear FBSDE (40) we
follow the usual four step scheme and look for solutions in the form Yt = StXt + st, where S and
s are two deterministic functions defined on [0, T ]. Consider the following matrix Riccati equation
with terminal condition:
S˙t + StA+ BˆSt + StBSt + Aˆ = 0, ST = 0, (41)
and the linear ODE
s˙t = −(Bˆ+ StB)st − (Cˆ+ StC), sT = 0. (42)
We observe that, when S is well-defined, the backward ODE (42) is always uniquely solvable. We
have the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. If the matrix Riccati equation (41) and the backward ODE (42) admit solutions
denoted by
St =

S
1,1
t S
1,2
t
S2,1t S
2,2
t
S3,1t S
3,2
t

 , st =

s1ts2t
s3t

 ,
then the FBSDE (39) is uniquely solvable. The first two components in the solution, namely
(X0, X¯0), is given by the solution of the linear SDE{
dX¯0t = (A0X¯
0
t −
1
2B0R
−1
0 B
†
0(S
1,1
t X
0
t + S
1,2
t X¯t + s
2
t ) + F0X¯t)dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dX¯t = (AX¯t −
1
2BR
−1B†(S3,1t X
0
t + S
3,2
t X¯t + s
3
t ) + FX¯t +GX¯
0
t )dt,
with initial conditions given by
X00 = x
0
0, , X¯0 = x0.
The processes (P¯ 0, P¯ , Y¯ ) are given by
P¯ 0t = S
1,1
t X
0
t + S
1,2
t X¯t + s
1
t , P¯t = S
2,1
t X
0
t + S
2,2
t X¯t + s
2
t , Y¯t = S
3,1
t X
0
t + S
3,2
t X¯t + s
3
t .
Proof. The proof is a pure verification procedure. 
We now turn to the original conditional FBSDE (38). Now that X0, X¯t, P¯
0 and P¯ are found,
we plug them into the FBSDE and it becomes a standard linear FBSDE with random coefficients.
By using the fact that X0, X¯t, P¯
0 and P¯ are actually solutions of linear SDEs with deterministic
coefficients, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2. The FBSDE (38) has a unique solution. Moreover, there exist a deterministic
function K and a F0t -progressively measurable process k such that
Yt = KtXt + kt. (43)
Proof. We plug X0, X¯ , Y¯ , P¯ 0 and P¯ into (38), and we readily observe that the second and the
last equations form a standard FBSDE with random coefficients. The structure of this FBSDE
is standard in the sense that it can be derived from an stochastic optimal control problem, which
yields (43). We now plug all the known processes into the third and the fourth equations in (38),
which yields a standard BSDE whose well-posedness is well known. The processes P 0 and P thus
follow. 
It becomes apparent that the solvability of the Riccati equation (41) plays an instrumental role
in the study of the unique solvability of (37). In order to address this problem we first define the
(2d0 + 3d)× (2d0 + 3d)-matrix B as
B =
(
A B
Aˆ Bˆ
)
.
We then define Ψ(t, s) as
Ψ(s, s) = exp(B(t− s)),
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in other words Ψ(t, s) is the propagator of the matrix ODE X˙t = BXt and satisfies
d
dt
Ψ(t, s) = BΨ(t, s),
with initial condition Ψ(s, s) = I2d0+3d. We further consider the block structure of Ψ(T, t) and write
Ψ(T, t) =
(
Γ1,1t Γ
1,2
t
Γ2,1t Γ
2,2
t
)
.
We have the following sufficient condition for the unique solvability of (41).
Proposition 5.3. If for each t ∈ [0, T ], the (d0 + 2d)× (d0 + 2d)-matrix Γ
2,2
t is invertible and the
inverse is a continuous function of t, then
St = −
(
Γ2,2t
)−1
Γ2,1t
solves the Riccati equation (41).
The assumption in Proposition 5.3 will be denoted by assumption (A’). The above 3 propositions
tell us that if assumption (A’) holds, then we can apply Theorem 4.1. Consequently we have
Theorem 5.1. Assume that assumption (A’) is in force. There exist a sequence (ǫN )N≥1 and a
non-decreasing function ρ : R+ → R+such that
(i) There exists a constant c such that for all N ≥ 1,
ǫN ≤ cN
−1/(d+4).
(ii) The partially feedback profile(
−
1
2
R−10 B
†
0(S
1,1
t X
0,N
t + S
1,2
t X¯t + s
1
t ), (−
1
2
R−1B†(KtX
i,N
t + kt))1≤i≤N
)
forms an ρ(κ)ǫN -Nash equilibrium for the (N + 1)-player LQG game when the sets of admissible
controls are taken as Aκ0 ×
∏N
i=1A
κ
i .
6. A Concrete Example
The scheme proposed in this paper differs from the one proposed in [24, 25] as the control
problem faced by the major player is here of the conditional McKean-Vlasov type, and the measure
flow is endogenous to the controller. This makes the limiting problem a bona fide two-player game
instead of a succession of two consecutive standard optimal control problems. Essentially, this adds
another fixed point problem, coming from the Nash equilibrium for the two-player game, on top
of the fixed point problem of step 3 of the standard mean field game paradigm. The reader may
wonder whether after solving the two fixed point problems of the current scheme, we could end up
with the same solution as in the scheme proposed in [24, 25]. In order to answer this question, we
provide a concrete example, in which we show that the two solutions are different, and the Nash
equilibria for finite-player games indeed converge to the solution of the scheme proposed in this
paper.
We consider the (N + 1)-player game whose state dynamics are given by{
dX0,Nt = (
a
N
∑N
i=1X
i,N
t + bu
0,N
t )dt+D0dW
0
t , X
0,N
0 = x
0
0,
dX i,Nt = cX
0,N
t dt+DdW
i
t , X
i,N
0 = x0, i = 1, 2, ..., N,
the objective function of the major player is given by
J0,N = E
[ ∫ T
0
(
q|X0,Nt |
2 + |u0,Nt |
2
)
dt
]
,
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and the objective functions of the minor players are given by
J i,N = E
[ ∫ T
0
|ui,Nt |
2dt
]
.
All the processes considered in this section one-dimensional. We search for an open loop Nash
equilibrium. As we can readily observe, in this finite-player stochastic differential game, the minor
players’ best responses are always 0, regardless of other players’ control processes. Therefore, the
only remaining issue is to determine the major player’s best response to the minor players using a
zero control. This amounts to solving a stochastic control problem. This minimalist structure of
the problem will facilitate the task of differentiating the current scheme from those of [24, 25].
6.1. Finite-player Game Nash Equilibrium. We use the stochastic maximum principle. The
admissible controls for the major player are the square-integrable F0t -progressively measurable pro-
cesses. His Hamiltonian is given by
H = y0(
a
N
N∑
i=1
xi + bu0) + cx0
N∑
i=1
yi + qx
2
0 + u
2
0.
The minimization of the Hamiltonian is straightforward. We get uˆ0 = −by0/2. Applying the game
version of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle leads to the FBSDE:

dX0,Nt = (
a
N
∑N
i=1X
i,N
t −
1
2 b
2Y 0,Nt )dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dX i,Nt = cX
0,N
t dt+DdW
i
t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
dY 0,Nt = −(c
∑N
i=1 Y
i,N
t + 2qX
0,N
t )dt+
∑N
j=0 Z
0,j,N
t dW
j
t ,
dY i,Nt = −
a
N Y
0,N
t dt+
∑N
j=0 Z
i,j,N
t dW
j
t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
The initial conditions for the state processes are the same as always, and will be omitted system-
atically in the following. The terminal conditions read Y i,NT = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ N . Keeping in mind
the fact that the optimal control identified by the necessary condition of the Pontryagin stochastic
maximum principle is uˆ0,Nt = −bY
0,N
t /2 it is clear that, what matters in the above equations, is the
aggregate behavior of the processes (X i,N ) and (Y i,N ). Accordingly we introduce
XNt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
X i,Nt , Y
N
t =
N∑
i=1
Y i,Nt ,
and the above FBSDE leads to the system:

dX0,Nt = (aX
N
t −
1
2b
2Y 0,Nt )dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dXNt = cX
0,N
t dt+
D
N d(
∑N
i=1W
i
t ),
dY 0,Nt = −(cY
N
t + 2qX
0,N
t )dt+
∑N
j=1 Z
0,j,N
t dW
j
t ,
dY Nt = −aY
0,N
t dt+
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=0 Z
i,j,N
t dW
j
t ,
and by conditioning with respect to F0t for the last two equations we have

dX0,Nt = (aX
N
t −
1
2b
2Y¯ 0,Nt )dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dXNt = cX
0,N
t dt+
D
N d(
∑N
i=1W
i
t ),
dY¯ 0,Nt = −(cY¯
N
t + 2qX
0,N
t )dt+ Z
0,0
t dW
0
t ,
dY¯ Nt = −aY¯
0,N
t dt+
∑
i Z
i,0
t dW
0
t ,
where we used an over line on top of a random variable to denote its conditional expectation with
respect to F0t . by following the usual scheme of solving FBSDEs we see that the solvability of the
above FBSDE depends on the solvability of
S˙t + StA+ BˆPt + PtBPt + Aˆ = 0, ST = 0, (44)
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where we define
A =
(
0 a
c 0
)
, B =
(
− b
2
2 0
0 0
)
, Aˆ =
(
2q 0
0 0
)
, Bˆ =
(
0 c
a 0
)
,
and St is a 2× 2 matrix which can be decomposed as
S =
(
S0,0t S
0,1
t
S1,0t S
1,1
t
)
.
If the Riccati equation (44) is uniquely solvable, we solve the following forward SDE{
dX0,Nt = (aX
N
t −
1
2b
2(S0,0t X
0,N
t + S
0,1
t X
N
t ))dt +D0dW
0
t ,
dXNt = cX
0,N
t dt+
D
N d(
∑N
i=1W
i
t ).
and we obtain the optimally controlled dynamic for the major player. The optimal control is given
by
u0t = −
b
2
Y¯ 0,Nt .
6.2. The Current Scheme. The scheme introduced in this paper proposes to solve the McKean-
Vlasov control problem consisting of the controlled dynamics{
dX0t = (aE[Xt|F
0
t ] + bu
0
t )dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dXt = cX
0
t dt+DdWt,
the objective function remains to be
J0 = E
∫ T
0
[q(X0t )
2 + (u0t )
2]dt.
Applying directly the result in the LQG part of the paper we get the FBSDE

dX0t = (aX¯t −
1
2b
2P¯ 0t )dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dXt = cX
0
t dt+DdWt,
dP 0t = −(2qX
0
t + cPt)dt+Q
00
t dW
0
t +Q
01
t dWt,
dPt = −aP¯
0
t dt+Q
10
t dW
0
t +Q
11
t dWt,
and after conditioning we get

dX0t = (aX¯t −
1
2b
2P¯ 0t )dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dX¯t = cX
0
t dt,
dP¯ 0t = −(2qX
0
t + cP¯t)dt+ Q¯
00
t dW
0
t ,
dP¯t = −aP¯
0
t dt+ Q¯
10
t dW
0
t .
(45)
We still use the four-step scheme to solve this FBSDE, and we see that the associated Riccati
equation is again (44). We then solve the forward SDE{
dX0t = (aX¯t −
1
2b
2(S0,0t X
0
t + S
0,1
t X¯t))dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dX¯t = cX
0
t dt,
and we obtain the solution. The optimal control u0 is given by − b2 P¯
0
t . We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 6.1. For all t ∈ [0, T ] we have
|X0,Nt −X
0
t |+ |X
N
t − X¯t| ≤ e
KtD
N
N∑
i=1
W it .
As a result, we have that for all t ∈ [0, T ],
X0,Nt → X
0
t , X
N
t → X¯t, Y
0,N
t → P¯
0
t , Y
N
t → P¯t, a.s.,
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and finally we have the convergence of the optimal controls for the finite-player games towards the
limiting optimal control, namely
u0,Nt → u
0
t a.s., ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. For a fixed t > 0, by calculating the difference between the SDEs satisfied by processes X0,N ,
XN , X0 and X¯ , we see that there exists a constant K such that
|X0,Nt −X
0
t |+ |X
N
t − X¯t| ≤ K
∫ t
0
|X0,Ns −X
0
s |+ |X
N
s − X¯s|ds+
D
N
N∑
i=1
max
0≤s≤t
|W is |,
and since the function t→ DN
∑n
i=1max0≤s≤t |W
i
s | is increasing in t, we have the desired inequality.
The convergence of the processes follows by letting N go to infinity.
6.3. The Scheme in [24, 25]. We now turn to the scheme proposed in [24, 25]. We start by fixing
a F0t -progressively measurable process m, and solve the control problem consisting of the dynamics
dX0t = (amt + bu
0
t )dt+D0dW
0
t , X
0
0 = x
0
0,
and the objective function
J0 = E
∫ T
0
[q(X0t )
2 + (u0t )
2]dt.
By applying the usual Pontryagin maximum principle we quickly arrive at the following FBSDE
characterizing the optimally controlled system:

dX0t = (amt −
1
2b
2Y 0t )dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dY 0t = −2qX
0
t dt+ Z
0
t dW
0
t ,
X00 = x
0
0, Y
0
T = 0.
We then impose the consistency condition mt = E
[
Xt|F
0
t
]
:= X¯t which leads to the FBSDE:

dX0t = (aX¯t −
1
2b
2Y 0t )dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dX¯t = cX
0
t dt,
dY 0t = −2qX
0
t dt+ Z
0
t dW
0
t ,
(46)
The comparison of (46) and (45) will be based on the following proposition.
Proposition 6.2. There exists t ∈ [0, T ] and an event E ⊂ Ω such that P(E) > 0 and on E,
P¯ 0t 6= Y
0
t .
Proof. We prove this proposition by contradiction. Assume that for all t, almost surely P¯ 0t = Y
0
t .
Plugging them into the first two equations of (46) and (45), by uniqueness of solutions of SDEs, we
know that the X0 and X¯ in these two systems are equal. Computing the difference between the
third equations of (46) and (45), we conclude that P¯ is 0 by uniqueness of solutions of BSDE. Using
the fourth equation in (45) we see that P¯ is 0, and finally again by uniqueness of solutions of BSDE
we see that X0 is 0 because it is the driver in the third equation in (45). This is a contradiction.
Note that the optimal control provided by the scheme in [24, 25] is given by − b2Y
0. In light of
Proposition 6.1 and 6.2, we conclude that the two schemes lead to different optimal controls, and
the Nash equilibria for the finite-player games converge towards the one produced by the current
scheme, instead of the one produced by the scheme proposed in [24, 25].
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7. Conditional Propagation of Chaos
In this section we consider a system of (N + 1) interacting particles with stochastic dynamics:

dX0,Nt = b0(t,X
0,N
t , µ
N
t )dt+ σ0(t,X
0,N
t , µ
N
t )dW
0
t ,
dX i,Nt = b(t,X
i,N
t , µ
N
t , X
0,N
t )dt+ σ(t,X
i,N
t , µ
N
t , X
0,N
t )dW
i
t , i = 1, 2, ..., N,
X0,N0 = x
0
0, X
i,N
0 = x0, i = 1, 2, ..., N,
(47)
on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), where the empirical measure µN was defined in (2). Here (W i)i≥0
is a sequence of independent Wiener processes, W 0 being n0-dimensional and W
i n-dimensional for
i ≥ 1. The major-particle process X0,N is d0-dimensional, and the minor-particle processes X
i,N
are d-dimensional for i ≥ 1. The coefficient functions
(b0, σ0) : [0, T ]× Ω× R
d0 × P2(R
d)→ Rd0 × Rd0×m0 , ,
(b, σ) : [0, T ]× Ω× Rd × P2(R
d)× Rd0 → Rd × Rd×m,
are allowed to be random, and as usual, P2(E) denotes the space of probability measures on E
having a finite second moment. We shall make the following assumptions.
(A1.1) The functions b0 and σ0 (resp. b and σ) are P
W 0 ⊗ B(Rd0) ⊗ B(P(Rd))-measurable (resp.
PW
0
⊗ B(Rd) ⊗ B(P(Rd)) ⊗ B(Rd0)-measurable), where PW
0
is the progressive σ-field associated
with the filtration F0t on [0, T ]× Ω and B(P(R
d)) is the Borel σ-field generated by the metric W2.
(A1.2) There exists a constant K > 0 such that for all t ∈ [0, T ], ω ∈ Ω, x, x′ ∈ Rd, x0, x
′
0 ∈ R
d0
and µ, µ′ ∈ P2(R
d),
|(b0, σ0)(t, ω, x0, µ)− b0(t, ω, x
′
0, µ
′)| ≤ K(|x0 − x
′
0|+W2(µ, µ
′)),
|(b, σ)(t, ω, x, µ, x0)− b(t, ω, x
′, µ′, x′0)| ≤ K(|x− x
′|+ |x0 − x
′
0|+W2(µ, µ
′)).
(A1.3) We have
E
[∫ T
0
|(b0, σ0)(t, 0, δ0)|
2 + |(b, σ)(t, 0, δ0, 0)|
2dt
]
<∞.
Our goal is to study the limiting behaviour of the solution of the system (47) when N tends to
infinity. The limit will be given by the so-called limiting nonlinear processes, but before defining it,
we need to introduce notations and definitions for the regular versions of conditional probabilities
which we use throughout the remainder of the paper.
7.1. Regular conditional distributions and optional projections. We consider a measurable
space (Ω,F) and we assume that Ω is standard and F is its Borel σ-field to allow us to use regular
conditional distributions for any sub-σ-field of F . In fact, if (Gt) is a right continuous filtration,
we make use of the existence of a map ΠG : [0,∞) × Ω →֒ P(Ω) which is (O,B(P(Ω))-measurable
and such that for each t ≥ 0, {ΠGt (ω,A); ω ∈ Ω, A ∈ F} is a regular version of the conditional
probability of P given the σ-field Gt. Here O denotes the optional σ-field of the filtration (Gt). This
result is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 in [29] applied to the the process (Xt) given by the
identity map of Ω and the constant filtration Ft ≡ F . For each t ≥ 0, we define the probability
measures P⊗ΠGt and Π
G
t ⊗ P on Ω
2 = Ω× Ω via the formulas
P⊗ΠGt (A×B) =
∫
A
ΠGt (ω,B)P(dω). and Π
G
t ⊗ P(A×B) =
∫
B
ΠGt (ω,A)P(dω). (48)
It is easy to check that, integrals of functions of the form Ω2 ∋ (ω, ω˜) →֒ ϕ(ω)ψ(ω˜) with respect to
these two measures are equal. This shows that these two measures are the same. We will use this
result in the following way: if X is measurable and bounded on Ω2, we can interchange ω and ω˜ in
the integrand of ∫
Ω2
X(ω, ω˜)ΠGt (ω, dω˜)P(dω)
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without changing the value of the integral.
In this section, we often use the notation EGt for the expectation with respect to the transition
kernel ΠGt , i.e. for all random variable X : Ω
2 ∋ (ω, ω˜) →֒ X(ω, ω˜) ∈ R, we define
E
Gt [X(ω, ω˜)] =
∫
Ω
X(ω, ω˜)ΠGt (ω, dω˜),
which, as a function of ω, is a random variable on Ω. Also, we still use E to denote the expectation
with respect to the first argument, i.e.
E[X ] =
∫
Ω
X(ω, ω˜)P(dω),
which, as a function of ω˜, is a random variable on Ω. Finally, whenever we have a random variable
X defined on Ω, we define the random variable X˜ on Ω2 via the formula X˜(ω, ω˜) = X(ω˜).
7.2. Conditional McKean-Vlasov SDEs. In order to define properly the limiting nonlinear
processes, we first derive a few technical properties of the conditional distribution of a process with
respect to a filtration. We now assume that the filtration (Gt) is a sub-filtration of a right continuous
filtration (Ft), in particular Gt ⊆ Ft for all t ≥ 0, and that (Xt) is an Ft-adapted continuous process
taking values in a Polish space (E, E). Defining µXt (ω) as the distribution of the random variable Xt
under the probability measure ΠGt (ω, · ), we obtain the following result which we state as a lemma
for future reference.
Lemma 7.1. There exists a stochastic measure flow µX : [0,∞)× Ω→ P(E) such that
(1) µX is P/B(P(E))-measurable, where P is the progressive σ-field associated to (Gt) on
[0,∞)× Ω, and B(P(E)) the Borel σ-field of the weak topology on P(E).
(2) ∀t ≥ 0, µXt is a regular conditional distribution of Xt given Gt;
We first study the well-posedness of the SDE:
dXt = b(t,Xt,L(Xt|Gt))dt+ σ(t,Xt,L(Xt|Gt))dWt. (49)
We say that this SDE is of the conditional McKean-Vlasov type because the conditional distribution
of Xt with respect to Gt enters the dynamics. Note that when Gt is the trivial σ-field, (49) reduces
to a classical McKean-Vlasov SDE. In the following, when writing L(Xt|Gt) we always mean µ
X
t ,
for the stochastic flow µX whose existence is given in Lemma 7.1.
The analysis of the SDE (49) is done under the following assumptions. We let W be a m-
dimensional Wiener process on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), F0t its (raw) filtration, Ft = F
W
t its
usual P-augmentation, and Gt a sub-filtration of Ft also satisfying the usual conditions. We impose
the following standard assumptions on b and σ:
(B1.1) The function
(b, σ) : [0, T ]× Ω× Rn × P(Rn) ∋ (t, ω, x, µ) →֒ (b(t, ω, x, µ), σ(t, ω, x, µ)) ∈ Rn × Rn×m
is PG ⊗ B(Rn) ⊗ B(P(Rn))-measurable, where PG is the progressive σ-field associated with the
filtration Gt on [0, T ]× Ω;
(B1.2) There exists K > 0 such that for all t ∈ [0, T ], ω ∈ Ω, x, x′ ∈ Rn, and µ, µ′ ∈ P2(R
n), we
have:
|b(t, ω, x, µ)− b(t, ω, x′, µ′)|+ |σ(t, ω, x, µ)− σ(t, ω, x′, µ′)| ≤ K(|x− x′|+W2(µ, µ
′)).
(B1.3) It holds:
E
[∫ T
0
|b(t, 0, δ0)|
2 + |σ(t, 0, δ0)|
2dt
]
<∞.
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Definition 7.1. By a (strong) solution of (49) we mean an Ft-adapted continuous process X taking
values in Rn such that for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
b(s,Xs,L(Xs|Gs))ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs,L(Xs|Gs))dWs, a.s..
In order to establish the well-posedness of (49) we need some form of control on the 2-Wasserstein
distance between two conditional distributions. We shall use the following dual representation:
Proposition 7.1. If µ, ν ∈ P2(E) where E is an Euclidean space, then:
W 22 (µ, ν) = sup
φ∈CLip
b
(E)
(∫
E
φ∗dµ−
∫
E
φdν
)
,
where φ∗(x) := infz∈E φ(z) + |x− z|
2.
We shall use the following consequences of this representation.
Lemma 7.2. If X and Y are two random variables of order 2 taking values in a Euclidean space,
and G a sub-σ-field of F , then for all p ≥ 2 we have:
W p2 (L(X |G),L(Y |G)) ≤ E[|X − Y |
p|G], a.s..
By taking expectations on both sides we further have
E [W p2 (L(X |G),L(Y |G))] ≤ E[|X − Y |
p].
Proof. By using the above dual representation formula and the characteristic equation for condi-
tional distributions, we get
W 22 (L(X |G),L(Y |G)) = sup
φ∈CLip
b
(E)
E[φ∗(X)− φ(Y )|G] ≤ E[|X − Y |2|G],
and the first inequality follows by applying the conditional Jensen’s inequality. 
We then have the following well-posedness result.
Proposition 7.2. The conditional McKean-Vlasov SDE (49) has a unique strong solution. More-
over, for all p ≥ 2, if we replace the assumption (B1.3) by
E
∫ T
0
|b(t, 0, δ0)|
p + |σ(t, 0, δ0)|
pdt <∞,
then, the solution of (49) satisfies
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Xt|
p
]
<∞.
Proof. The proof is an application of the contraction mapping theorem. For each c > 0, we consider
the space of all Ft-progressively measurable processes satisfying
‖X‖2c := E
[∫ T
0
e−ct|Xt|
2dt
]
<∞.
This space will be denoted by H2c . It can be easily proven to be a Banach space. Furthermore, for
all X ∈ H2c, we have
L(Xt|Gt) ∈ P2(R
n), a.s., a.e..
and we can define
Ut = x0 +
∫ t
0
b(s,Xs,L(Xs|Gs))ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs,L(Xs|Gs))dWs.
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It is easy to show that U ∈ H2c. On the other hand, if we fix X,X
′ ∈ H2c and let U and U
′ be the
processes defined via the above equality from X and X ′ respectively, we have
E
[∣∣∣∣
∫ t
0
b(s,X ′s,L(X
′
s|Gs))− b(s,Xs,L(Xs|Gs))ds
∣∣∣∣
2
]
≤ 2TK2E
[∫ t
0
|X ′s −Xs|
2 +W 22 (L(X
′
s|Gs),L(Xs|Gs))ds
]
≤ 2TK2E
[∫ t
0
|X ′s −Xs|
2ds
]
,
and we have the same type of estimate for the stochastic integral term by replacing the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality by the Ito isometry. This yields
‖U ′ − U‖2c =E
[∫ T
0
e−ct|U ′t − Ut|
2dt
]
≤2(T + 1)K2E
[∫ T
0
e−ct
(∫ t
0
|X ′s −Xs|
2ds
)
dt
]
≤
2(T + 1)K2
c
‖X ′ −X‖2c,
and this proves that the map X → U is a strict contraction in the Banach space H2c if we choose
c sufficiently large. The fact that the solution possesses finite moments can be obtained by using
standard estimates and Lemma 7.2. We omit the proof here. 
In the above discussion, Gt is a rather general sub-filtration of the Brownian filtration F
W
t . From
now on, we shall restrict ourselves to sub-filtrations Gt equal to the Brownian filtration generated
by the first r components of W for some r < m. We rewrite (49) as
dXt = b(t,Xt,L(Xt|G
W
t ))dt+ σ(t,Xt,L(Xt|G
W
t ))dWt, (50)
and we expect that the solution of the SDE (50) is given by a deterministic functional of the
Brownian paths. In order to prove this fact in a rigorous way, we need the following notion.
Definition 7.2. By a set-up we mean a 4-tuple (Ω,F ,P,W ) where (Ω,F ,P) is a probability space
with a d-dimensional Wiener process W . We use FWt to denote the natural filtration generated by W
and GWt to denote the natural filtration generated by the first r components of W . By the canonical
set-up we mean (Ωc,Fc,W, B), where Ωc = C([0, T ];Rm), Fc is the Borel σ-field associated with
the uniform topology, W is the Wiener measure and Bt is the coordinate (marginal) projection.
Proposition 7.2 basically states that the SDE (50) is uniquely solvable on any set-up, and in
particular it is uniquely solvable on the canonical set-up. The solution in the canonical set-up,
denoted by Xc, gives us a measurable functional from C([0, T ];Rd) to C([0, T ];Rn). Because of the
important role played by this functional, in the following we use Φ (instead of Xc) to denote it.
Lemma 7.3. Let ψ : C([0, T ];Rm)→ Rn be FBt -measurable, then we have
L(ψ|GBt )(W·) = L(ψ(W·)|G
W
t ).
Proof. By the definition of conditional distributions, it suffices to prove that for all bounded mea-
surable functions f : Rn → R+ we have
E
[
f(ψ(W·))|G
W
t
]
= E
[
f(ψ)|GBt
]
(W·),
and by using the definition of conditional expectations the above equality can be easily proved. 
With the help of Lemma 7.3, we can state and prove
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Proposition 7.3. On any set-up (Ω,F ,P,W ), the solution of (50) is given by
X· = Φ(W·).
Proof. We are going to check directly that Φ(W·) is a solution of (50). By the definition of Φ as the
solution of (50) on the canonical set-up, we have
Φ(w) = x0 +
∫ t
0
b(s,Φ(w)s,L(Φ(·)s|G
B
s )(w))ds +
∫ t
0
σ(s,Φ(w)s,L(Φ(·)s|G
B
s )(w))dBs,W− a.s.,
where w stands for a generic element in the canonical space C([0, T ];Rm). By using Lemma 7.3 we
thus have
Φ(W·) = x0 +
∫ t
0
b(s,Φ(W·)s,L(Φ(W·)s|G
B
s ))ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Φ(W·)s,L(Φ(W·)s|G
B
s ))dWs,P− a.s.,
which proves the desired result. 
7.3. The Nonlinear Processes. The limiting nonlinear processes associated with the particle
system (47) is defined as the solution of

dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t ,L(X
1
t |F
0
t ))dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t ,L(X
1
t |F
0
t ))dW
0
t ,
dX it = b(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t |F
0
t ), X
0
t )dt+ σ(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t |F
0
t ), X
0
t )dW
i
t , i ≥ 1,
X00 = x
0
0, X
i
0 = x0, i ≥ 1.
(51)
Under the assumptions (A1.1)-(A1.3), the unique solvability of this system is ensured by Proposi-
tion 7.2. Due to the strong symmetry among the processes (X i)i≥1, we first prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.4. For all i ≥ 1, the solution of (51) solves the conditional McKean-Vlasov SDE{
dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t ,L(X
i
t |F
0
t ))dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t ,L(X
i
t |F
0
t ))dW
0
t ,
dX it = b(t,Xt,L(X
i
t |F
0
t ), X
0
t )dt+ σ(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t |F
0
t ), X
0
t )dW
i
t ,
and for all fixed t ∈ [0, T ], the random variables (X it)i≥1 are F
0
t -conditionally i.i.d..
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 7.3. 
Now that the nonlinear processes are well-defined, in the next subsection we prove that these
processes give the limiting behaviour of (47) when N tends to infinity.
7.4. Conditional Propagation of Chaos. We extend the result of the unconditional theory to the
conditional case involving the influence of a major player. As in the classical case, the propagation
appears in a strong path wise sense.
Theorem 7.1. There exists a constant C such that
max
0≤i≤N
E[ sup
0≤t≤T
|X i,Nt −X
i
t |
2] ≤ CN−2/(d+4),
where C only depends on T , the Lipschitz constants of b0 and b and
η = E
[∫ T
0
|X1t |
d+5dt
]
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Proof. We first note that, by the SDEs satisfied by X0 and X0,N and the Lipschitz conditions on
the coefficients,
|X0,Nt −X
0
t |
2
=(
∫ t
0
b0(s,X
0,N
s ,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXj,Ns )− b(s,X
0
s , µs)ds)
2
≤K(
∫ t
0
|X0,Ns −X
0
s |
2ds+
∫ t
0
W 22 (
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXj,Ns ,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXjs )ds
+
∫ t
0
W 22 (
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXjs , µs)ds)
≤K(
∫ t
0
|X0,Ns −X
0
s |
2ds+
∫ t
0
1
N
N∑
j=1
(Xj,Ns −X
j
s )
2ds
+
∫ t
0
W 22 (
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXjs , µs)ds).
We take the supremum and the expectation on both sides, by the exchangeability we get
E[ sup
0≤s≤t
|X0,Ns −X
0
s |
2]
≤K(
∫ t
0
E[ sup
0≤u≤s
|X0,Nu −X
0
u|
2]ds+
∫ t
0
E[(X1,Ns −X
1
s )
2]ds
+
∫ t
0
E[W 22 (
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXjs , µs)]ds)
≤K(
∫ t
0
E[ sup
0≤u≤s
|X0,Nu −X
0
u|
2]ds+
∫ t
0
E[ sup
0≤u≤s
|X1,Nu −X
1
u|
2]ds
+
∫ t
0
E[W 22 (
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXjs , µs)]ds),
By following the above computation we can readily obtain the same type of estimate for X1,N−X1:
E[ sup
0≤s≤t
|X1,Ns −X
1
s |
2] ≤ K ′(
∫ t
0
E[ sup
0≤u≤s
|X0,Nu −X
0
u|
2]ds+
∫ t
0
E[ sup
0≤u≤s
|X1,Nu −X
1
u|
2]ds
+
∫ t
0
E[W 22 (
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXjs , µs)]ds),
by summing up the above two inequality and using the Gronwall’s inequality we get
E[ sup
0≤t≤T
|X0,Nt −X
0
t |
2] + E[ sup
0≤t≤T
|X1,Nt −X
1
t |
2]
≤K
∫ T
0
E[W 22 (
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXjt
, µt)]ds ≤ KE
[∫ T
0
|X1t |
d+5
]
N−2/(d+4),
where the second inequality comes from a direct application of Lemma 4.1, with the help of
Lemma 7.2, and this proves the desired result. 
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8. Appendix: A Maximum Principle for Conditional McKean-Vlasov Control
Problems
In this last section, we establish a version of the sufficient part of the stochastic Pontryagin
maximum principle for a type of conditional McKean-Vlasov control problem. In some sense these
results are extensions of the results in [7], and we will refer the reader to [7] for details and proofs.
The setup is the following: (Ω,F ,P) is a probability space, (Ft) is a filtration satisfying the usual
conditions defined on Ω. (Gt) and (Ht) are two sub-filtrations of (Ft) also satisfying the usual
conditions, and (Wt) is a n-dimensional Ft-Wiener process. We assume that the probability space
Ω is standard.
The controlled dynamics are given by
dXt = b(t,Xt,L(Xt|Gt), ut)dt+ σ(t,Xt,L(Xt|Gt), ut)dWt, (52)
with initial condition X0 = x0, and the objective function to minimize is given by
J(u) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt,L(Xt|Gt), ut) + g(XT ,L(XT |GT ))
]
,
where X is d-dimensional and u takes values in U ⊂ Rk which is convex. The set of admissible
controls is the space H2,k(Ht, U) defined in (9). We shall use the assumptions:
(A2.1) For all x ∈ Rd, µ ∈ P2(R
d) and u ∈ U , [0, T ] ∋ t →֒ (b, σ)(t, x, µ, u) is square-integrable.
(A2.2) For all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rd, µ, µ′ ∈ P2(R
d) and u ∈ U , we have
|b(t, x′, µ′, u)− b(t, x, µ, u)|+ |σ(t, x′, µ′, u)− σ(t, x, µ, u)| ≤ c(|x′ − x|+W2(µ
′, µ)).
(A2.3) The coefficient functions b, σ, f and g are differentiable with respect to x and µ.
We note that under (A2.1-2), for all admissible controls the controlled SDE (52) has a unique
solution which is square-integrable. (A2.3) will be used in defining the adjoint processes.
8.1. Hamiltonian and Adjoint Processes. The Hamiltonian of the problem is defined as
H(t, x, µ, y, z, u) = 〈y, b(t, x, µ, u)〉+ 〈z, σ(t, x, µ, u)〉+ f(t, x, µ, u).
Given an admissible control u ∈ H2,k(Ht, U), the associated adjoint equation is defined as the
following BSDE: 

dYt =− ∂xH(t,Xt,L(Xt|Gt), Yt, Zt, ut)dt+ ZtdWt
− EGt [∂µH(t, X˜t,L(X˜t|Gt), Y˜t, Z˜t, u˜t)(Xt)],
YT = ∂xg(XT ,L(XT |GT )) + E
GT [∂µg(X˜T ,L(X˜T |GT ))(XT )],
(53)
where X = Xu denotes the state controlled by u, and whose dynamics are given by (52). We refer
the reader to [7] for the definition of differentiability with respect to the measure argument. This
BSDE is of the McKean-Vlasov type because of the presence of the conditional distributions of
various Xt in the coefficients and the terminal condition. However, standard fixed point arguments
can be used to prove existence and uniqueness of a solution to these equations.
8.2. Sufficient Pontryagin Maximum Principle. The following theorem gives us a sufficient
condition of optimality.
Theorem 8.1. On the top of assumptions (A2.1-3), we assume that
(1) The function Rd × P2(R
d) ∋ (x, µ) →֒ g(x, µ) is convex.
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(2) The function Rd × P2(R
d)× U ∋ (x, µ, u) →֒ H(t, x, µ, Yt, Zt, u) is convex dt⊗ P a.e.
(3) For any admissible control u′ we have the following integrability condition
E

(∫ T
0
‖σ(t,X ′t,L(X
′
t|Gt), u
′
t) · Yt‖
2dt
) 1
2

 <∞, E

(∫ T
0
‖X ′t · Zt‖
2dt
) 1
2

 <∞. (54)
Moreover, if
E[H(t,Xt,L(Xt|Gt), Yt, Zt, ut)|Ht] = inf
u∈U
E[H(t,Xt,L(Xt|Gt), Yt, Zt, u)|Ht], (55)
then (ut)0≤t≤T is an optimal control of the conditional McKean-Vlasov control problem.
Proof. The various steps of the proof of theoremTheorem 4.6 in [7] can be followed mutatis mu-
tandis once we remarks that, the interchanges of variables made in Theorem 4.6 of [7] when using
independent copies can be done in the same way in the present situation. Indeed, the justification
for these interchanges was given at the end of Subsection 7.1 earlier in the previous section. 
One final observation is that a sufficient condition for the integrability condition (55) is that,
on the top of (A2.1)-(A2.3), we have Y ∈ S2,d and Z ∈ H2,d×n, which is an easy consequence of the
Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality.
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